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The Lessons of Impeachment History 
Michael J. Gerhardt* 
Introduction 
Over the past decade, I have had several occasions to study in detail the 
background and history of the federal impeachment process. In this Article, 
I wish to share the results of these prior studies. These studies have the ad-
vantage of having been undertaken at times when the Congress was not in 
the midst of any ongoing impeachment proceedings. My focus in the past has 
not been on setting the record straight in any particular case, nor is it in the 
present circumstance on resolving whether the misconduct for which the 
House of Representatives has impeached President Clinton-particularly 
perjury and making false statements to a grand jury-actually rises to the 
level of an impeachable offense. Instead, my focus has been to clarify what 
constitutional structure and history has to teach us about the process of im-
peachment. These lessons in tum help to clarify the kinds of questions that 
members of Congress should ask and the kinds of factors members of Con-
gress should take into consideration when trying to decide whether to im-
peach and remove the President of the United States. 
As background, Part I identifies the ways in which the Founders pur-
posely tried to distinguish the federal impeachment process from its British 
counterpart. Of particular importance were the Founders' desires to narrow 
or restrict the range of both impeachable offenses and the persons who would 
be subject to impeachment, in contrast to the British system in which there 
was no limit to either the kinds of people who could be impeached or to the 
kinds of offenses for which the latter may have been impeached. 
Part II examines the likeliest meaning of the terms of art "other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors" that provide the bases for federal impeachment. 
The weight of authority, as most other scholars and commentators have 
found, is that these words constitute technical terms of art that refer to polit-
ical crimes. For the most part, the Founders did not regard political crimes to 
be the functional equivalent of indictable crimes nor all indictable crimes to 
constitute impeachable offenses. Rather, the Framers considered political 
crimes to consist of "great" and "dangerous" offenses committed by certain 
federal officials. Oftentimes, these offenses were characterized further as se-
rious abuses of official power or serious breaches of the public trust. The 
Founders also understood that these offenses might have been, but were not 
necessarily, punishable in the courts. Indeed, many Founders had the further 
understanding that the scope of impeachable offenses largely consisted of 
* Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary. B.A., Yale University; M.Sc., 
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those misdeeds for which an impeachable official was not likely (for whatever 
reason) to be held liable at law. 
Given that the Founders expected that the scope of impeachable of-
fenses would work itself out over time on a case-by-case basis, I tum in Part 
III to consider the possible lessons that might be derived from trends or pat-
terns in the Congress's past impeachment practices. 
Six are especially noteworthy. The first is that proof of an impeachable 
official's commission of an indictable crime has tended to increase the odds 
of impeachment. This trend poses, however, a problem of constitutional di-
mension, because it blurs the lines that the Framers had tried to draw clearly 
between criminal and impeachable offenses. 
The second pattern is that members of Congress, particularly in the Sen-
ate, have agreed with the view that impeachable offenses are not necessarily 
indictable crimes but rather are political crimes in which a critical element is 
serious injury to the political order or the constitutional system. 
The third is the relatively widespread recognition of the paradigmatic 
case for impeachment as being based on the abuse of power. The three arti-
cles of impeachment approved by the House Judiciary Committee against 
President Richard Nixon have come to symbolize this paradigm. The great 
majority of impeachments, if not all of the impeachments brought by the 
House and convictions by the Senate, approximate this paradigmatic case; all 
of these cases, with the possible exception of one or two, involve the serious 
misuse of office or official prerogatives or breaches of the public trusts held. 
The fourth trend is based on the recognition of some legitimate im-
peachment actions falling outside of the paradigmatic case. The latter cate-
gory, perhaps best symbolized by the impeachment and removal of federal 
district judge Harry Claiborne is that there may be some kinds of misconduct 
in which an impeachable official might engage that are so outrageous and 
thoroughly incompatible with an official's status or responsibilities that they 
effectively disable the official from being able to continue to function at all in 
his or her present office, and Congress thus has no choice but to impeach and 
remove an official who has engaged in such misconduct. 
The fifth conceivable trend is a relatively widespread recognition in Con-
gress over the years (consistent with the constitutional structure) that im-
peachment is not the only means available to the House or the Senate to 
express its disapproval of an impeachable official's misconduct. In other 
words, censure-consisting of a resolution passed by one or both houses of 
Congress that is highly critical of an impeachable official's conduct-is a con-
stitutionally acceptable alternative (or, for that matter, supplement) to 
impeachment. 
The final pattern is that members of the House, and particularly the Sen-
ate, have recognized in the course of debating impeachment that their im-
peachment judgments are sui generis. Unlike decisions about legislative 
matters, congressional impeachment decisions are not subject to presidential 
review or veto or judicial review. Instead, impeachment judgments are, for 
all intents and purposes, final. Their legitimacy turns on the public's accept-
ance of Congress's actions and ultimately the judgment of history. Conse-
quently, in rendering decisions on impeachment matters, members of 
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Congress generally have had to consider whether their decisions to impeach 
(or to forego impeachment) can withstand the test of time. Members of Con-
gress have appreciated that their decisions constitute precedents in the field 
of impeachment, and these precedents have had a significant impact on the 
balance of power between the Congress and the other branches (whose offi-
cials have been the subject of impeachment actions). In the final analysis, the 
critical questions are structural and historical. The structural questions have 
to do with the degree to which impeachment decisions are consistent with or 
alter basic separation of powers, while the historical questions have to do 
with whether subsequent generations largely will agree that the impeachment 
decisions were made on a nonpartisan basis. 
I. The Framers' Objectives in Structuring the Impeachment Process 
The discussions of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention and 
state ratifying conventions provide some important background for appreci-
ating the distinctive features of the federal impeachment process. The Foun-
ders wanted to distinguish the impeachment power set forth in the United 
States Constitution from the British practice in at least eight important ways. 
First, the Founders limited impeachment only to "[t]he President, Vice Presi-
dent and all civil Officers of the United States,"1 whereas at the time of the 
founding of the Republic, anyone (except for a member of the royal family) 
could be impeached in England. Second, the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention narrowed the range of impeachable offenses for public office-
holders to "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,"2 
although the English Parliament always had refused to constrain its jurisdic-
tion over impeachments by restrictively defining impeachable offenses. 
Third, whereas the English House of Lords could convict upon a bare major-
ity, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention agreed that in an im-
peachment trial held in the Senate, "no Person shall be convicted [and 
removed from office] without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members 
present."3 Fourth, the House of Lords could order any punishment upon 
conviction, but the delegates limited the punishments in the federal impeach-
ment process "to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy 
any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States."4 Fifth, the 
king could pardon any person after an impeachment conviction, but the dele-
gates expressly prohibited the President from exercising such power in the 
Constitution.5 Sixth, the Founders provided that the President could be im-
peached,6 whereas the King of England could not be impeached. Seventh, 
impeachment proceedings in England were considered to be criminal, but the 
Constitution separates criminal and impeachment proceedings.? Lastly, the 
1 u.s. CoNST. art II, § 4. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
4 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
5 See rd. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
6 See rd. art. II, § 4. 
7 See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its 
Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1, 23 (1989). 
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British provided for the removal of their judges by several means, whereas 
the Constitution provides impeachment as the sole political means of judicial 
removal.8 
Of these distinctive features, the one of greatest contemporary concern 
is the Founders' choice of the words-"Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors" -for delineating and narrowing the scope of the 
federal impeachment process. The Founders did not discuss the meaning of 
"other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" extensively, certainly not in any way 
that definitively resolves the precise meanings of those terms. Nevertheless, 
the context and content of the Founders' principal discussions about the 
phrase "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" provide an important back-
drop to contemporary efforts to understand the meaning of the phrase. 
Throughout the early debates in the Constitutional Convention on the 
scope of impeachable offenses, every speaker agreed that certain high-rank-
ing officials of the new national government should not have immunity from 
prosecution for common law crimes, such as treason and murder. Many dele-
gates also envisioned a body of offenses for which these federal officials 
could be impeached. They believed that clarifying this body of offenses was 
important for two reasons-the first was to narrow the bases for which peo-
ple could be impeached in the United States (in contrast to the unbounded 
system in England), and the second was to clarify the grounds for which peo-
ple could be impeached and removed that many Framers were concerned 
would not otherwise be punishable at law. 
Early in the Convention's proceedings, several delegates referred to 
"mal-" and "corrupt administration," "neglect of duty," and "misconduct in 
office" as the only impeachable offenses and maintained that common law 
crimes such as treason and bribery were to be heard in the courts of law.9 
Some delegates, notably William Paterson, Edmund Randolph, James Wil-
son, and George Mason, argued that the federal impeachment process should 
apply to misuse of official power in accordance with their respective state 
constitutions and experiences. As late as August 20, 1787, the Committee of 
Detail reported that federal officials "shall be liable to impeachment and re-
moval from office for neglect of duty, malversation, or corruption."10 
Yet, in its report on September 4, 1787, the Committee of Eleven pro-
posed that the grounds for conviction and removal of the President should be 
limited to "treason or bribery."11 On September 8, George Mason opened 
the Convention's discussion on this latter proposal by questioning the wis-
dom of limiting impeachment to those two offenses. He argued that 
8 See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PRoCESs: A CoN. 
STITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 82-102 (1996). The Founders also provided a couple 
of other special protections in the Senate; they required that "[w]hen sitting for th[e] Purpose [of 
trying impeachments, senators] shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the 
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
9 See Peter CHARLEs HoFFER & N.E.H. HuLL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 
101 (1984); see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 64-69 (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND]. 
10 2 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 101. 
n See id. at 495. 
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"[t]reason as defined in the Constitution [would] not reach many great and 
dangerous offences. "12 He used as an example of such subversion the con-
temporaneous English impeachment of Governor Warren Hastings of the 
East India Company, whose trial was based in part not upon specific criminal 
acts, but rather upon the dangers presented to the government by the Gover-
nor's wielding of virtually absolute power within the Indian colony. Mason 
was concerned that "[a]ttempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Trea-
son as ... defined," and that, since "bills of attainder ... are forbidden, it is 
the more necessary to extend[] the power of impeachments."13 Mason 
therefore moved to add the term "maladministration" to permit impeach-
ment upon less conventionally defined common law offenses.14 Elbridge 
Gerry seconded the motion. James Madison, without taking issue with either 
the appropriateness of including such subversion or the need to expand the 
standard to include such potentially noncriminal wrongs, responded that 
"[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Sen-
ate."15 Recalling an earlier debate on June 20 in which he had asked for 
more "enumerated and defined" impeachable offenses, Gouverneur Morris 
agreed with Madison.16 Mason thereupon withdrew his motion and substi-
tuted "other high crimes & misdemeanors ag[ain]st the State," which Mason 
apparently understood as including maladministrationP Without further 
comment, the motion was approved by a vote of eight to three.18 
The Convention, again without discussion, later agreed to replace the 
word "State" with the words "United States."19 The Committee of Style and 
Arrangement, which was responsible for reworking the resolutions without 
substantive change, eliminated the phrase "against the United States,"20 pre-
sumably because it was thought to be redundant or superfluous. The Con-
vention accepted the shortened phrase without any further debate on its 
meaning. 
Subsequently, the most substantial discussions of the scope of impeacha-
ble offenses, besides those in The Federalist (discussed in the section below), 
occurred in the ratification conventions in North Carolina and Virginia. For 
instance, in the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell, who later 
would serve as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court, called attention to 
the complexity, if not impossibility, of defining the scope of impeachable of-
fenses any more precisely than to acknowledge that they would involve seri-
ous injustices to the federal governinent. He understood impeachment as 
having been "calculated to bring [great offenders] to punishment for crime 
which it is not easy to describe, but which every one must be convinced is a 
high crime and misdemeanor against the government. ... [T]he occasion for 
12 Id. at 550. 
13 ld. 
14 See id. 
15 Id. 
16 See id. at 65. 
17 Id. at 550. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. at 551. 
20 See id. at 600. 
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its exercise will arise from acts of great injury to the community .... "21 As 
examples of impeachable offenses, he suggested that the "president must cer-
tainly be punishable for giving false information to the Senate" and that "the 
president would be liable to impeachments [if] he had received a bribe or had 
acted from some corrupt motive or other."22 He warned, though, that the 
purpose of impeachment was not to punish a President for "want of judg-
ment," but rather to hold him responsible for being a "villain" and "willfully 
abus[ing] his trust."23 Governor Johnston, who would later become North 
Carolina's first U.S. senator, agreed that impeachment "is a mode of trial 
pointed out for great misdemeanors against the public."24 
In the Virginia convention, several speakers argued that impeachable of-
fenses were not limited to indictable crimes. For instance, James Madison 
argued that, if the President were to summon only a small number of states in 
order to try to secure ratification of a treaty that hurt the interests of the 
other unrepresented states, "he would be impeached and convicted, as a ma-
jority of the states would be affected by his misdemeanor."25 Madison sug-
gested further that "if the president be connected, in any suspicious manner, 
with any person, and there be grounds to believe that he will shelter him," 
the President may be impeached.26 George Nicholas agreed that a President 
could be impeached for a nonindictable offense. Edmund Randolph ex-
plained that "[i]n England, those subjects which produce impeachments are 
not opinions . . . . It would be impossible to discover whether the error in 
opinion resulted from a willful mistake of the heart, or an involuntary fault of 
the head."27 He stressed that only the former constituted an impeachable 
offense. 
In the decade following ratification, the federal impeachment process 
remained a subject of some debate and concern. For instance, in the First 
Congress, Representative James Madison tried to calm the fears of some of 
his colleagues about possible presidential abuse of authority to remove exec-
utive officials by suggesting that the President "will be impeachable by this 
House, before the Senate for such an act of mal-administration; for I contend 
that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject him to im-
peachment and removal from [office]."28 Although one could construe 
Madison's comment as meretricious, because it supported a position that he 
had taken in a partisan debate rather than as a framer (and because it argua-
bly conflicted with his objection in the Constitutional Convention to making 
"maladministration" a basis for impeachment), Madison's comment is consis-
tent with the stance he took in the Virginia ratifying convention to support 
presidential impeachment for nonindictable abuses of power. 
21 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED· 
ERAL CoNSTITUTION 113 (photo. reprint 1937) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT's 
DEBATES]. 
22 /d. at 526-27. 
23 Id. at 126. 
24 Id. at 48. 
25 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 21, at 500. 
26 /d. at 498. 
21 Id. at 401. 
28 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 498 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
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Immediately following his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1790, 
James Wilson gave a series of lectures as a professor of law at the College of 
Philadelphia to clarify the foundations of the American Constitution. In 
these talks, given in 1790-1791 but published posthumously, Justice Wilson 
described the essential character of impeachments as proceedings of a polit-
ical nature, "confined to political characters, to political crimes and misde-
meanors, and to political punishments."29 He emphasized that the Founders 
believed that 
[i]mpeachments, and offences and offenders impeachable, [did not] 
come . . . within the sphere of ordinary jurisprudence. They are 
founded on different principles; are governed by different maxims, 
and are directed to different objects: for this reason, the trial and 
punishment of an offence on an impeachment, is no bar to a trial 
and punishment of the same offence at common law.30 
Hence, Wilson, one of the most thoughtful and influential of the propo-
nents of the new Constitution, strongly endorsed the basic idea that one of 
the fundamental features of the federal impeachment process is its separate-
ness and distinctiveness from judicial proceedings. 
IL The Historical and Constitutional Meaning of Political Crimes 
The relatively few comments made about the meaning of "other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors," as understood by the Founders in the constitu-
tional and state ratifying conventions, do not definitively clarify the scope of 
impeachable offenses. The reason is not just because the Founders failed to 
discuss the topic extensively or to anticipate all of the likely issues or cases 
that would arise in this area. The reason is that in choosing to make "other 
high Crimes or Misdemeanors" the basis for impeachable offenses, the Foun-
ders deliberately chose terms of art that referred to a general category of 
offenses, the specific contents of which would have to be worked out over 
time on a case-by-case basis. 
The great majority of commentators who have examined closely the 
likely meaning of the constitutional phrase "other high Crimes and Misde-
meanors," including Justice James Wilson,31 Justice Joseph Story,32 Chief Jus-
tice Charles Evans Hughes,33 Justice Arthur Goldberg,34 Charles Black,35 
Raoul Berger,36 George Curtis,37 Arthur Bestor,38 Paul Fenton,39 Peter 
29 JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law part 2, No.1, Of the Constitutions of the United States 
and of Pennsylvania-of the Legislative Department, in 1 THE WoRKS OF JAMES WILSON 399, 
426 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). 
30 JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, No.ll, Comparison of the Constitution of the United 
States, with that of Great Britain, in 1 THE WoRKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 29, at 324. 
31 See id. 
32 See 1 JosEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES oN THE CoNSTITUTION oF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 796-800, at 580-85 (photo. reprint 1994) (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 1891). 
33 See CHARLES E. HuGHES, THE SUPREME CoURT OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (1928). 
34 See Arthur J. Goldberg, The Question of Impeachment, 1 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 5, 6 
(1974). 
35 See CHARLES L. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 35, 39-40 (1974). 
36 See RAouL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CoNSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 58, 59 (1973). 
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Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull,40 John Feerick,41 and John Labovitz (a former staff 
member of the House Judiciary Committee investigating President Nixon),42 
have reached the same conclusion: The phrase "other high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors" consists of technical terms of art referring to "political crimes." 
They also have agreed that "political crimes" had a special meaning in the 
eighteenth century; "political crimes" were not necessarily indictable 
crimes.43 Instead, "political crimes" consisted of the kinds of abuses of power 
or injuries to the Republic that only cpuld be committed by public officials by 
virtue of the public offices or privileges that they held.44 Although the con-
cept "political crimes" uses the term "crimes," the phrase did not necessarily 
include all indictable offenses.45 Nor were all indictable offenses considered 
"political crimes."46 
To appreciate what would constitute "political crimes," one needs to ex-
amine the British impeachment practices from which the Founders drew the 
language "other high crimes and misdemeanors" and thus the concept of 
"political crimes." In the Engli~h experience prior to the drafting and ratifi-
cation of the Constitution, impeachment was primarily a political proceeding, 
and impeachable offenses were regarded as "political crimes." For instance, 
Raoul Berger observed in his influential study of the impeachment process 
that the English practice treated "'[h]igh crimes and misdemeanors' [as] a 
category of political crimes against the state. "47 Berger supported this obser-
vation with quotations from relevant periods in which the speakers use terms 
equivalent to "political" and "against the state" to identify the distinguishing 
characteristics of an impeachable event.48 In England, the critical element of 
injury in an impeachable offense had been injury to the State.49 The eminent 
legal historian, Blackstone, traced this peculiarity to the ancient law of trea-
son, which distinguished "high" treason, which was disloyalty against some 
superior, from "petit" treason, which was disloyalty to an equal or an infer-
ior.50 The late Professor Arthur Bestor explained further that "[t]his element 
37 See 1 GEORGE T. CuRTIS, CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 481-82 
(photo. reprint 1974) (1896). 
38 See Arthur Bestor, Impeachment, 49 WASH. L. REv. 255, 264·66 (1973) (reviewing 
RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973)). 
39 See PaulS. Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 Nw. U. L. REv. 719,726-
28 (1970). 
40 See HoFFER & HuLL, supra note 9, at 101. 
41 See John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provi-
sions, 39 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1, 47-58 (1970). 
42 See JoHN R. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 27-31, 127 (1978). 
43 See, e.g., id. at 27; HuGHES, supra note 33, at 19; Fenton, supra note 39, at 727. 
44 See, e.g., Bestor, supra note 38, at 264-65; Feerick, supra note 41, at 50, 53. 
45 See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 41, at 53. 
46 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 35, at 35-36; STORY, supra note 32. 
47 BERGER, supra note 36, at 61. 
48 See id. at 59-61. 
49 See Bestor, supra note 38, at 264. 
so See id. Blackstone commented that: 
Treason ... in its very name (which is borrowed from the French) imports a be-
traying, treachery, or breach of faith ... [T]reason is ... a general appellation, 
made use of by the law, to denote ... that accumulation of guilt which arises when-
ever a superior reposes a confidence in a subject or inferior, ... and the inferior ... 
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of injury to the commonwealth-that is, to the state itself and to its constitu-
tion-was historically the criterion for distinguishing a 'high' crime or misde-
meanor from an ordinary one."51 In summary, the English experience 
reveals that there was a 
difference of degree, not a difference of kind, separat[ing] 'high' 
treason from other 'high' crimes and misdemeanors ... [and that] 
[t]he common element in [English impeachment proceedings] 
was ... injury done to the state and its constitution, whereas among 
the particular offenses producing such injury some might rank as 
treasons, some as felonies and some as misdemeanors, among which 
might be included various offenses that in other contexts would fall 
short of actual criminality.52 
In addition, those delegates in the constitutional and state ratifying con-
ventions who supported the federal Constitution seemed to have a shared 
understanding of impeachment as a political proceeding and impeachable of-
fenses as essentially "political crimes."53 The delegates at the Constitutional 
Convention were intimately familiar with impeachment in colonial America, 
which like impeachment in England, had basically been a political proceed-
ing. Although the debates in the Convention primarily focused on the of-
fenses for which the President could be impeached and removed, there was 
general agreement that the President could be impeached only for so-called 
"great" offenses. 54 Moreover, the majority of examples given throughout the 
Convention debates about the scope of impeachable offenses, such as 
Madison's preference for the phrase "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" 
because it encompassed attempts to subvert the Constitution, confirm that 
impeachable offenses primarily consisted of abuses of power that injured the 
State (and thus were not necessarily limited to indictable offenses). Neither 
the debates nor the relevant constitutional language eventually adopted, 
however, identifies the specific offenses that constitute impeachable abuses 
against the State. 
The ratification campaign further supports the conclusion that "other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors" were not limited to indictable offenses, but 
rather included great offenses against the federal government. For example, 
delegates to state ratification conventions often referred to impeachable of-
so forgets the obligations of duty, subjection, and allegiance, as to destroy the life 
of any such superior or lord .... [T]herefore for a wife to kill her lord or husband, a 
servant his lord or master, and an ecclesiastic his lord or ordinary; these, being 
breaches of the lower allegiance, of private and domestic faith, are denominated 
petit treasons. But when disloyalty so rears it's [sic] crest, as to attack even majesty 
itself, it is called by way of eminent distinction high treason, alta· proditio; being 
equivalent to the crimen laesae majestatis of the Romans. 
/d. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTO:t-."E, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 75 (1765-
69)). 
51 See id. at 263-64. 
52 !d. at 265. 
53 See id. at 266. 
54 See BERGER, supra note 36, at 88 ("James Iredell, later a Supreme Court Justice, told 
the North Carolina Convention [during the ratification campaign] that the 'occasion for its exer-
cise [impeachment] will arise from acts of great injury to the community.'"). 
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fenses as "great" offenses (as opposed to common law crimes), and they fre-
quently spoke of how impeachment should lie if the official "deviates from 
his duty"55 or if he "dare[ s] to abuse the powers vested in him by the 
people."56 
In The Federalist No. 65, Alexander Hamilton echoed such sentiments, 
observing that: 
[t]he subjects [of the Senate's] jurisdiction [in an impeachment trial] 
are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public 
men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public 
trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be 
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
immediately to the society itself.57 
Believing it unwise to submit the impeachment decision to the Supreme 
Court because of "the nature of the proceeding,"58 Hamilton argued that the 
impeachment court could not be "tied down" by "strict rules, either in the 
delineation of the offense by the prosecutors [the House of Representatives] 
or in the construction of it by the judges [the Senate]."59 In short, Hamilton 
too believed that impeachable offenses comprised a unique set of transgres-
sions that defied neat delineation. 
Both Justice James Wilson and Justice Joseph Story expressed agree-
ment with Hamilton's understanding of impeachable offenses as political 
crimes. In his lectures on the new Constitution given immediately after his 
appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Wilson referred to impeachments 
as involving, inter alia, "political crimes and misdemeanors."60 Justice Wilson 
understood the term "high," describing "Crimes and Misdemeanors," to 
mean "political," while the term "Misdemeanors" referred to bad conduct 
against the state. Similarly, Justice Joseph Story recognized the unique polit-
ical nature of impeachable offenses: "The jurisdiction is to be exercised over 
offences which are committed by public men in violation of their public trust 
and duties. Those duties are in many cases political . . . . Strictly speaking, 
then, the power partakes of a political character, as it respects injuries to the 
society in its political character .... "61 Justice Story also viewed the penal-
ties of removal and disqualification as "limiting the punishment to such 
modes of redress as are peculiarly fit for a political tribunal to administer, 
and as will secure the public against political injuries."62 Justice Story under-
stood "political injuries" to be "[s]uch kind of misdeeds ... as peculiarly 
injure the commonwealth by the abuse of high offices of trust."63 
Like Hamilton, Justice Story understood that the Framers proceeded as 
if there would be a federal common law on crimes from which future Con-
55 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 21, at 32 (J. Iredell of North Carolina). 
56 2 id. at 169 (S. Stillman of Massachusetts). 
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
58 Id. at 398. 
59 ld. 
60 See WILSON, supra note 29, at 426. 
61 SToRY, supra note 32, § 746, at 547. 
62 Id. § 812, at 591. 
63 Id. § 790, at 575. 
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gresses could draw the specific or particular offenses for which certain federal 
officials may be impeached and removed from office. Justice Story explained 
that "no previous statute is necessary to authorize an impeachment for any 
official misconduct."64 Nor, in Justice Story's view, could such a statute ever 
be drafted, because "political offenses are of so various and complex a char-
acter, so utterly incapable of being defined, or classified, that the task of posi-
tive legislation would be impracticable, if it were not almost absurd to 
attempt it."65 The implicit understanding shared by both Hamilton and Jus-
tice Story was that subsequent generations would have to define on a case-
by-case basis the political crimes serving as contemporary impeachable 
offenses. 
The remaining problem is how to identify the nonindictable offenses for 
which certain high-level government officials may be impeached. This task is 
critical for providing notice to impeachable officials as to the conditions of, 
and for narrowing in some meaningful fashion, the grounds for their removal. 
The likeliest places to look for guidance are to the Framers' debates or au-
thoritative commentary on the meaning of the relevant constitutional lan-
guage (as reflected above) and historical practices. The latter do provide 
some insight into the answer to this challenge. First, it is noteworthy that of 
the sixteen men impeached by the House of Representatives, only four were 
impeached primarily or solely on grounds strictly constituting a criminal of-
fense: Secretary of War William Belknap (charged with accepting bribes); 
Judge Harry Claiborne (charged with willfully making false tax statements); 
Judge Alcee Hastings (charged \vith conspiring to solicit a bribe and perjury), 
and Judge Walter Nixon (charged with perjury). One of these four, Alcee 
Hastings, had been acquitted formally of bribery prior to his impeachment. 
The House's articles of impeachment against the other twelve include mis-
uses of power that were not indictable federal offenses, at least at the time 
that they were approved. 66 
64 Id. § 799, at 583. 
65 Id. § 797, at 581. 
66 These twelve include Senator William Blount (impeached in 1797 for engaging in a con-
spiracy to compromise the neutrality of the United States in disregard of the constitutional pro-
visions for the conduct of foreign affairs and for an attempt to oust the President's lawful 
appointee as principal agent for Indian affairs, thereby intruding upon the President's supervi-
sion of the executive branch); Judge John Pickering (impeached in 1803 for making errors in 
conducting a trial in violation of his trust and duty and for "being a man of loose morals and 
intemperate habits," 13 ANNALS OF CoNG. 322 (1803), who appeared on the bench drunk and 
used profane language); Associate Justice Samuel Chase (impeached in 1804 for allowing his 
partisan views to influence his conduct of two trials and for delivering "an intemperate and 
inflammatory political harangue" to a grand jury and thus conducting himself "in a manner 
highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust," 14 ANNALS OF CoNG. 731 (1804)); Judge James Peck 
(impeached in 1826 for vindictive use of power in charging with contempt, imprisoning, and 
disbarring a lawyer who publicly had criticized one of his decisions); Judge West W. Humphreys 
(impeached in 1862 for neglect of duty because he had joined the Confederacy without resigning 
his position as a federal judge); President Andrew Johnson (impeached in 1868 for violating the 
Tenure in Office Act by removing a member of his cabinet, interfering with execution of that 
Act, and making inflammatory speeches that subjected the Congress to ridicule); Judge Mark 
Delahay (impeached in 1876 for intoxication both on and off the federal bench); Judge George 
W. English (impeached in 1926 for using his office for personal monetary gain as well as for 
threatening to jail a local newspaper editor for printing a critical editorial and summoning local 
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Of the seven men who have been convicted and removed from office by 
the Senate, four were convicted and removed from office on the basis of 
nonindictable offenses. These four officials included Judge John Pickering 
(convicted and removed for public drunkenness and blasphemy);67 Judge 
West H. Humphreys (convicted and removed by the Senate for having advo-
cated publicly that Tennessee secede from the Union, having organized 
armed rebellion against the United States, having accepted a judicial commis-
sion from the Confederate Government, holding court pursuant to that com-
mission, and failing to fulfill his duties as a United States District Judge);68 
Judge Robert Archbald (convicted, removed, and disqualified by the Senate 
for obtaining contracts for himself from persons appearing before his court 
and others and for adjudicating cases in which he had a financial interest or 
received payment-offenses for which, as the Chairman of the House Im-
peachment Committee at the time conceded, no criminal charges could be 
brought);69 and Judge Halsted Ritter (who was convicted and removed from 
office on the sole basis that he had brought "his court into scandal and disre-
pute, to the prejudice of said court and public confidence in the administra-
tion of justice therein, and to the prejudice of public respect for and 
confidence in the Federal judiciary.").70 Of the remaining three officials who 
were convicted and removed from office by the Senate, all three were con-
victed and removed from office on the basis of indictable crimes. These three 
officials included Harry Claiborne (income tax invasion), Alcee Hastings 
(bribery and perjury), and Walter Nixon (making false statements to a grand 
jury). Prior to their impeachments and removals from office, two of these 
judges, Claiborne and Nixon, had been indicted, convicted in federal court, 
and had exhausted their criminal appeals. 
Given that certain federal officials may be impeached and removed from 
office for committing serious abuses against the state and that these abuses 
have not always been, nor necessarily should be, confined to indictable of-
fenses, the persistent challenge has been to find contemporary analogues to 
the abuses against the state that authorities such as Hamilton, Justice Wilson, 
and Justice Story viewed as suitable grounds for impeachment. On the one 
hand, these abuses may be reflected in certain statutory crimes. (The Consti-
tution itself defines treason as "consist[ing] only in levying War against [the 
United States], or, in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Com-
fort."71) At least one federal criminal statute, the bribery statute,72 codifies 
officials into court under false pretext to harangue them); Judge Charles Swayne {impeached in 
1903 for maliciously and unlawfully imprisoning two lawyers and a litigant for contempt and for 
using his office for personal monetary gain); Judge Robert Archbald (impeached in 1912 for 
direct and indirect personal monetary gain); Judge Harold Louderback (impeached in 1932 for 
direct and indirect personal monetary gain); and Judge Halsted Ritter {impeached in 1936 for 
direct and indirect personal monetary gain and for engaging in behavior that brought the judici-
ary into disrepute). See Jason J. Vicente, Impeachment: A Constitutional Primer, 3 TEx. REv. L. 
& PoL. 117 {1998). 
67 See 13 ANNALS OF CoNG. 319-22 {1804). 
68 See CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2949-50 {1862). 
69 See 48 CoNG. REc. 8910 (1912). 
10 80 CoNG. REc. 5606 {1936). 
71 U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
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an impeachable offense because bribery expressly is designated as such in the 
Constitution. Violations of other federal criminal statutes may also reflect 
abuses against the State sufficient to subject the perpetrator to impeachment, 
insofar as the offenses involved demonstrate willful misconduct and serious 
lack of judgment and respect for the law in the course of performing one's 
duties. In other words, it is conceivable that there are certain statutory 
crimes that, if committed by public officials, reflect such abuses of the privi-
leges of their offices, breaches of the public trust, disregard for the welfare of 
the state, and disrespect or disdain for the constitutional system, that the offi-
cials who have committed such misconduct have effectively disabled them-
selves from continuing in office and thus merit impeachment and removal. 
On the other hand, not all statutory crimes demonstrate complete unfit-
ness for office. For example, "a President's technical violation of a law mak-
ing jaywalking [or speeding] a crime obviously would not be an adequate 
basis for presidential [impeachment and] removal."73 Moreover, it is equally 
obvious that some noncriminal activities may constitute impeachable of-
fenses. As Professor Laurence Tribe observed, "[a] deliberate presidential 
decision to emasculate our national defenses, or to conduct a private war in 
circumvention of the Constitution, would probably violate no criminal 
code,"74 but probably would constitute a nonindictable, impeachable offense. 
The full range of such political crimes defies further specification, because it 
rests on the circumstances under which the offenses have occurred (including 
the actor, the forum, the scope of the officer's official duties, and the nature 
and significance of the offensive act), alternative remedies, and on the collec-
tive political judgment of Congress.75 
IlL The Trends and Tenor of Congressional Practices Relating to 
the Scope of Impeachable Offenses 
The Founders considered that the political crimes constituting impeacha-
ble offenses would be clarified over time on a case-by-case basis. In other 
72 18 u.s.c. § 201 (1982). 
73 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw 294 (2d ed. 1988). 
74 !d. 
75 Certain constitutional safeguards apply to the impeachment process and should circum-
scribe congressional efforts to define political crimes. The Constitution includes several guaran-
tees to ensure that Congress will deliberate carefully prior to making any judgments in an 
impeachment proceeding: (1) when the Senate sits as a court of impeachment, "they shall be on 
Oath or Affirmation," U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; (2) at least two-thirds of the senators present 
must favor conviction in order for the impeachment to be successful, see id.; and (3) in the 
special case of presidential removal, the Chief Justice must preside so that the Vice President, 
who otherwise normally presides, is spared from having to oversee the impeachment trial of the 
one person who stands between him and the presidency. See id. 
1\vo other safeguards are political in nature. First, members of Congress seeking reelection 
have a political incentive to avoid any abuse of the impeachment power. The knowledge that 
they may have to account to their constituency may lead them to deliberate cautiously on im-
peachment questions. Second, the cumbersome nature of the impeachment process makes it 
difficult for a faction guided by base political motives to impeach and remove someone from 
office. Thus, these structural and political safeguards help to ensure that, as a practical matter, 
serious abuse of power and serious injury to the Republic are the prerequisites for Congress to 
find impeachable offenses. 
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words, the Founders expected that although the standard for impeachment 
would remain constant over time-whether an impeachable official had in-
jured seriously the Republic or the constitutional system-it would be ap-
plied on a case-by-case basis to determine whether it had been met in any 
given circumstance. Consequently, congressional practices are important, be-
cause they help to illuminate Congress's deliberate judgments over the past 
two centuries on what constitutes an impeachable offense. Given the likeli-
hood that Congress's judgments on impeachment are largely, if not wholly, 
immune to judicial review,76 these judgments take on even more importance 
than typical legislative actions because the former are prone neither to presi-
dential veto nor to judicial review. For all practical purposes, Congress's de-
cisions on impeachment constitute the final word on the scope of the federal 
impeachment power. Members of Congress thus give special consideration 
to their impeachment decisions. Indeed, a survey of the impeachments con-
sidered but formally rejected by the House and the sixteen formal impeach-
ments brought by the House and the seven convictions and six acquittals 
rendered by the Senate indicates six noteworthy patterns. 
A. The Relationship Between Criminal Actions and Impeachment 
Proceedings 
I already have alluded to the fact that the House has impeached and the 
Senate has removed persons for offenses that have not constituted (at least 
technically) indictable crimes. There is also a related tendency, however, for 
the Senate to convict on the basis of indictable crimes or at least to find 
conviction easier to effect if an indictable offense were involved. For exam-
ple, in the 1980s, the Senate convicted Judges Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon 
on the basis of indictable offenses. The convictions of Claiborne and Nixon 
demonstrate that the Congress is especially likely to impeach and to remove 
officials who previously have been convicted of felonies in court. Indeed, the 
criminal convictions of Claiborne and Nixon (and the Judicial Council's find-
ing that Hastings had engaged in criminal misconduct) clearly put pressure 
on Congress to bring impeachment actions against these officials. That such 
convictions can bring such pressure is a matter of concern to many members 
of Congress and to many scholars, because it indicates that under certain 
circumstances criminal prosecutors can drive the impeachment process. Be-
cause the Founders envisioned that criminal and impeachment proceedings 
would be separate, and that the discretions for initiating each belong to au-
thorities in different branches,77 members of Congress must undertake spe-
cial efforts to ensure that criminal prosecutors do not rob or unduly influence 
Congress's constitutional discretion to initiate or to conduct impeachment 
actions on the grounds that members think are appropriate. 
B. The Relative Consensus on the Scope of Impeachable Offenses 
The second pattern consists of the most common characterizations of 
impeachable offenses made in the constitutional and state ratifying conven-
76 See BERGER, supra note 36, at 103. 
77 See The Federalist No. 65, supra note 57. 
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tions and in Congress (particularly in the Senate) as consisting of serious 
abuse of power, serious breach of the public trust, and serious injury to the 
Republic or to the constitutional system. Given the division of impeachment 
authority between the House and the Senate, the Senate has had the oppor-
tunity to review House decisions on what constitutes an impeachable offense 
and has concluded (in the Chase and Johnson impeachment trials) that im-
peachable offenses do not include errors of judgment or policy differences. 
Instead, the seven removal decisions made by the Senate have in common 
the judgment that impeachable offenses consist of serious abuses of power or 
privilege, breaches of the public trust or misconduct that is so incompatible 
with the office that conviction and removal by the Senate are required. 
C. The Relative Consensus on the Paradigm for Presidential Impeachment 
The third trend is the apparent consensus among constitutional scholars 
and historians (if not also by members of Congress) that there may be a para-
digmatic case for impeachment consisting of the abuse of power. In the para-
digmatic case, there must be not only serious injury to the constitutional 
order but also a nexus between the misconduct of an impeachable official and 
the official's formal duties. It is this paradigm that Alexander Hamilton cap-
tured so dramatically in his suggestion that impeachable offenses derive from 
"the abuse or violation of some public trust" and are "of a nature which may 
with peculiar propriety be denominated POLmCAL, as they relate chiefly 
to injuries done immediately to the society itself."78 This paradigm is also 
implicit in the Founders' many references to abuses of power as constituting 
political crimes or impeachable offenses. 
The paradigm has come to be symbolized by the three articles of im-
peachment approved by the House Judiciary Committee against Richard 
Nixon-the articles charged obstruction of justice, abuse of powers, and un-
lawful refusal to supply material subpoenaed by the House of Representa-
tives.79 These charges derived from Nixon's misuse of the powers and 
privileges of his office to facilitate his re-election and to hurt his political 
enemies, as well as to frustrate or to impede inappropriately legitimate at-
tempts to investigate the extent of his misconduct. Nixon's misconduct effec-
tively disabled him from continuing to exercise the constitutional duties of his 
office. Keeping Nixon in office would have countenanced serious breaches of 
the public trust and abuses of power and would have demeaned the office of 
the presidency irreparably. 
Some of the House's decisions not to initiate impeachments or to ap-
prove impeachment articles, as well as by the Senate not to convict, are con-
sistent with this paradigm. For example, the Senate failed to convict 
Associate Justice Samuel Chase in part because some members did not be-
lieve that the conduct on which the House's charges had been based rose to 
the level of impeachable offenses or could be characterized fairly as the kinds 
· of indiscretions or mistaken judgments that fall within the legitimate scope of 
78 Id. at 396. 
79 See HousE CoMM. ON nm JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT oF RICHARD M. NIXoN, PRESI· 
DENT OF nm UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 1-4 (1974). 
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a judge's authority. Similarly, the House voted 127-83 not to impeach Presi-
dent Tyler for abusing his powers based on (1) his refusals to share with the 
House details on whom he was considering to nominate to various confirma-
ble positions and (2) his vetoing of a wide range of Whig-sponsored legisla-
tion. Tyler's attempts to protect and to assert what he regarded as the 
prerogatives of his office were a function of his constitutional and policy 
judgments; they might have been wrong-headed or even poorly conceived (at 
least in the view of many Whigs in Congress), but they were not malicious 
efforts to abuse or to expand his powers, as was true in Richard Nixon's case, 
for purely personal gain or aggrandizement. The Senate also refused to con-
vict Andrew Johnson by the slimmest of margins, because a small but pivotal 
number of senators believed, among other things, that the charges brought by 
the House against him did not rise to the level of impeachable offenses and 
because Johnson's real "crimes" were mistaken or erroneous policy judg-
ments rather than malicious abuses of power. 
The outcomes of the efforts to try to oust President Tyler and President 
Johnson confirm the suggestion made by Professors Peter Hoffer and N.E.H. 
Hull, in their excellent study of the history of impeachment in the United 
States, that impeachable offenses are not "simply political acts obnoxious to 
the government's ruling faction."80 In this century, the House rejected then-
Representative Gerald Ford's resolution to initiate an impeachment action 
against Justice William 0. Douglas, at least in part because a majority of 
members were not persuaded that either Douglas's lifestyle or the substance 
or content of his decisionmaking was a relevant subject for an impeachment 
inquiry. Indeed, then-Representative Ford agreed in introducing his im-
peachment resolution against Justice Douglas that the standards for impeach-
ing judges and presidents are different and that presidents could be 
impeached and removed from office only for "great" and "dangerous" of-
fenses. Moreover, the House Judiciary Committee refused to bring an article 
of impeachment against President Nixon based on fraud in preparing his 
taxes, at least in part because it was not the kind of misconduct that could 
have been committed only by a President because of the unique office or 
trust he held. 
It is also fair to say that the vast majority of the impeachments that have 
been brought by the House and the convictions that have been rendered by 
the Senate are consistent with the paradigmatic case. Most, if not all, of the 
officials impeached by the House81 and the seven officials convicted and re-
80 HoFFER & HuLL, supra note 9, at 101. 
81 These officials include the following: Senator William Blount (not only for engaging in 
conduct that undermined presidential authority and undermined the national government's rela-
tions with various Indian tributes, but also for acting in a rp.anner "contrary to the duty of his 
trust ... in violation of the obligations of neutrality, and against the laws of the United States, 
and the peace and interests thereof," 5 .ANNALS OF CoNG. 948-49 (1798)); Judge John Pickering 
(for making errors in conducting a trial in violation of his duty and trust and for engaging on the 
bench in behavior unbecoming of a federal judge); Associate Justice Samuel Chase (for con-
ducting himself on the bench "in a manner highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust," 14 ANNALS 
oF CoNG. 728-29 (1804)); Judge West Humphreys (for neglect of duty); President Andrew John-
son (for violating the Tenure in Office Act and for exercising his authority to interfere with the 
proper execution of the law); Judge Mark Delahay (for intoxication both on and off the bench); 
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moved by the Senate82 were found to have misused their offices or their pre-
rogatives or to have injured seriously the Republic by breaching the special 
trusts that they held by virtue of holding their federal offices. For example, in 
1986, the House impeached and the Senate convicted and removed from of-
fice federal district judge Harry Claiborne based on income tax evasion. At 
first glance, it seems as if Judge Claiborne's misconduct had no formal rela-
tionship to his official duties. Nevertheless, in impeaching and removing 
Claiborne, Congress reached the judgment that integrity is an indispensable 
criterion for someone to function as a federal judge. Moreover, as the House 
Report and subsequent Senate debate on Claiborne's impeachment reflected, 
the members of Congress concluded that the commission of tax evasion robs 
a federal judge of the moral authority required to oversee the trials and sen-
tencing of others for the very same offense. 83 In other words, a federal judge 
must have integrity beyond reproach in order to perform the functions of his 
or her office. Incontrovertible proof that a federal judge lacks integrity effec-
tively disables a federal judge completely from performing his or her duties. 
There is no doubt that integrity is also important for a President (or, for 
that matter, any appointed or elected official) to do his job. There is also no 
doubt that a demonstrated lack of integrity poses a problem for a President. 
Whether demonstrated absence of integrity poses a problem of impeachable 
dimensions for a President depends on the circumstances giving rise to ques-
tions about the President's integrity. If a President were to commit perjury 
or to make false statements in a case unrelated to his actions or responsibili-
ties as President, one still must ask whether this misconduct effectively robs 
him of the requisite moral authority to continue to function as President. It is 
conceivable that a President who has had his integrity scrutinized in an elec-
tion and nevertheless has been elected has achieved sufficient legitimacy to 
function as President and obviously has not been disabled completely by the 
questions raised about his integrity. Under these circumstances, elections 
perform a check on presidential misconduct. Such a check does not exist 
with respect to misconduct by federal judges. The. fact that such ratifying 
elections have occurred should be taken into account in calculating the mag-
Secretary of War William Belknap (for receiving an illegal payment in exchange for making a 
military appointment); Judge George English (for using his office for personal monetary gain); 
Judge James Peck (for vindictive use of power); Judge Charles Swayne (for exercising his power 
maliciously and for using his office for personal monetary gain); Judge Robert Archbald (for 
using his office for improper financial gain); Judge Harold Louderback (for using his office for 
improper financial gain); Judge Halsted Ritter (for engaging in behavior that brought disrepute 
to the judiciary); Harry Claiborne (for income tax evasion); Judge Alcee Hastings (for bribery 
and perjury); and Judge Walter Nixon (for making false statements to a grand jury). All seven 
convictions and removals made by the Senate have involved abuses of power and serious 
breaches of the public trust: Judge Pickering (for dmnkenness and senility); Judge Humphreys 
(for neglect of duty); Judge Archbald (for bribery); Judge Ritter (for engaging in misbehavior 
that brought the judiciary into disrepute); Judge Claiborne (for tax evasion); Judge Hastings (for 
conspiracy to solicit a bribe); and Judge Nixon (for making false statements to a grand jury). See 
Vicente, supra note 66. 
82 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
83 See HousE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE HARRY E. Cr.AI. 
BORNE, H.R. REP. No. 99-688, at 23 (1986); 132 CoNG. REc. 30,251-58 (1986). 
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nitude of the offense committed and the magnitude of the harm resulting to 
the Republic from the misconduct. 
A variation on this reasoning could be used to explain the House's im-
peachment and the Senate's conviction of Walter Nixon in 1989. Nixon was 
impeached and removed from his federal district judgeship for making false 
statements to a grand jury. In a criminal trial, he had been convicted of mak-
ing false statements to a grand jury about the efforts he had undertaken to 
influence a criminal prosecution of the son of a business partner. Clearly, the 
misconduct alleged did not strictly relate to Nixon's formal actions as a fed-
eral judge (for example, he was not formally functioning as a federal judge 
when talking with the state prosecutor about dropping the case). Neverthe-
less, whatever influence Nixon had available to exercise on behalf of his busi-
ness partner's son existed by virtue of the federal judgeship he held. 
Moreover, making false statements to a grand jury impugns a judge's integ-
rity at least as much, if not more, than does tax evasion (which involves the 
making of false statements under oath in a different manner). Again, the 
House and the Senate each reasonably concluded that the demonstrated lack 
of integrity robs a federal judge of the most important commodity he must 
have in order to perform his constitutional function. Nixon's misconduct 
completely disabled him from continuing to function as a federal judge. 
D. The Significance of Especially Outrageous or Incompatible Conduct 
My understandings of Congress's impeachment decisions regarding Clai-
borne, if not those involving Nixon, suggest that these decisions might also be 
understood as reflecting not an extension or variation of the paradigm for 
impeachment, but rather the possible existence of yet another trend of im-
peachment proceedings in which the nexus between an official's misconduct 
and his or her official duties is not so clear. This latter circumstance consists 
of those cases in which the misconduct in which an impeachable official has 
engaged is so outrageous and so plainly incompatible with their status that 
Congress has no choice but to impeach and to remove those officials from 
office. Congress could have decided that the misconduct for which it was 
impeaching and removing Claiborne as well as Walter Nixon was sufficiently 
outrageous or destructive of their capacities to function effectively as federal 
judges as to justify their impeachments and removals from office. There is 
little doubt that Congress's perception that each judge had engaged in such 
outrageous misconduct had been reinforced by the facts that prior to both 
judges' impeachments they had been criminally prosecuted, convicted, and 
imprisoned. Indeed, they both were continuing to receive their judicial sala-
ries while incarcerated. This outrageous circumstance intensified the pres-
sure placed on Congress to impeach the two federal judges. 
The possible existence of this second category of impeachable offenses 
helps to explain one of the most vexing hypotheticals repeatedly raised in-
volving the impeachment process: whether a President may be impeached 
and removed from office for murder. The nexus between the President's mis-
conduct (murder) and his official duties (taking care to enforce the laws faith-
fully) is not readily apparent, for it is not clear that the President's oath 
obligates the President in his private capacity to comply with every single 
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law, even those that he does not have the formal authority to enforce. Nev-
ertheless, impeachment, in all likelihood, is appropriate. The best explana-
tion why this is so was made by Professor Charles Black in his magnificent 
study of the impeachment process: 
Many common crimes-willful murder, for example-though not 
subversive of government or political order, might be so serious as 
to make a president simply unviable as a national leader; I cannot 
think that a president who had committed murder could not be re-
moved by impeachment. But the underlying reason remains much 
the same; such crimes would so stain a president as to make his 
continuance in office dangerous to public order.84 
E. Alternative Means of Redress 
Yet another pattern is the persistent recognition by Congress that its 
constitutionally vested authority or power includes the discretion not to exer-
cise the power or authority of impeachment if it sees fit. In the realm of 
impeachment, the House has recognized that its "sole Power of Impeach-
ment,"85 includes the discretion not to impeach an official even if a majority 
of its members thought or believed that the official had committed an im-
peachable offense or had engaged in misconduct that reasonably could be 
characterized as impeachable. Similarly, the Senate has the authority, im-
plicit within its "sole Power to try all Impeachments,"86 to decide not to con-
84 BLACK, supra note 35, at 39. It is noteworthy that Justice Story was uncertain about 
whether murder was an impeachable offense. He was not sure about the validity of William 
Rawle's assertion that 
[t]he legitimate causes of impeachment ... have reference only to public character, 
and official duty. . . . In general, those offences which may be committed equally by 
a private person as a public officer, are not the subjects of impeachment. Murder, 
burglary, robbery, and indeed all offences not immediately connected with office, 
except [treason and bribery], are left to the ordinary course of judicial proceeding. 
STORY, supra note 32, § 801, at 585 (quoting WILLIAM RAWLE, A Vmw OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 215 (2d ed. 1829)). In other words, at least for Rawle, the 
impeachment process could focus properly only on those acts committed or performed by a 
President strictly in "his public character." See 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 21, at 480 ( quot-
ing James Wilson in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention). The distinction recognized by Jus-
tice Story between the public acts that provide appropriate bases for impeachment and the 
private conduct that does not is accepted by most impeachment scholars. The critical question 
has to do with what is the appropriate dividing line between the two. Congress tends to answer 
this question on a case-by-case basis. Even so, this distinction does help to explain further why 
the House Judiciary Committee decided not to charge Richard Nixon with income tax fraud, 
why the House decided not to approve an impeachment inquiry of Justice William 0. Douglas 
based on his lifestyle or multiple marriages, and why Alexander Hamilton never was subjected 
to impeachment for having engaged (by his own admission) in an adulterous affair with a mar-
ried woman (whose husband then blackmailed Hamilton to keep the liaison secret). The fact 
that Harry Claiborne and Walter Nixon each were impeached and removed for arguably private 
actions turns on appreciating that the felonies each committed effectively robbed each of the 
basic asset necessary to function as a federal judge, integrity, and thus disabled each from contin-
uing to function effectively as a federal judge. 
ss U.S. CaNST. art. I., § 2, cl. 5. 
86 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
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viet or to remove an official even if most if not all of its members believed the 
latter had committed an impeachable offense. 
In deciding whether or not to impeach, the House and the Senate each 
have the power to consider whether it (or some other official body) has avail-
able alternatives (or supplements) to impeachment. One such alternative (or 
supplement) is censure. If one were to understand censure as consisting of 
nothing more than a resolution passed by the House or the Senate, it is 
plainly constitutional.87 In my opinion, every conceivable source of constitu-
tional authority-text, structure, and history-supports the legitimacy of the 
House's or the Senate's (or both's) passage of a resolution expressing disap-
proval of the President's conduct. First, there are several textual provisions 
of the Constitution confirming the House's authority to memorialize its opin-
ions on public matters. The Constitution both authorizes the House of Rep-
resentatives to "keep a Journal of its Proceedings"88 and provides that "for 
any Speech or Debate in either House, [members] shall not be questioned in 
any other place."89 One may plainly infer from these textual provisions the 
authority of the House or the Senate or both to pass a non-binding resolution 
in which each expresses its opinion-pro or con-on some public matter. 
Second, the passage of resolutions critical of a President is quite compat-
ible with the constitutional structure. The Constitution does not establish 
impeachment as the only constitutionally authorized means by which the 
House or the Senate may "censure" the President. Instead, impeachment 
exists as the only means by which the House may formally charge and 
thereby obligate the Senate to consider the removal of a President for certain 
kinds of misconduct. Removal and disqualification are the only sanctions 
that the Senate may impose if it were to convict an impeached official at the 
end of an impeachment trial.90 Otherwise, the constitutional structure leaves 
to the criminal process the investigation and punishment of all sorts of mis-
conduct (some but not all of which might overlap with impeachable miscon-
duct) and to the political process, broadly understood, the checking or 
censure of misconduct of a wide variety (including but not limited to offenses 
that do not rise to the level of an impeachable offense). 
Moreover, it is nonsensical to think that if a resolution has no legal ef-
fect, it somehow still might violate the law. By definition, a resolution has no 
effect on the law (or legal arrangements) in any way. To think that a resolu-
tion might have little or no practical effect is not a reason to think that it is 
unconstitutional; it is a reason to think perhaps that a resolution critical of 
the President might be a futile act politically. The calculation of whether a 
resolution is a worthwhile endeavor politically is separate and distinct from 
the question of whether it is constitutional. 
87 It is noteworthy that prior to the House's vote to impeach President Clinton, Represen-
tative William Delahunt (D-Mass.) had sought the opinions regarding the constitutionality of 
censure of the nineteen constitutional scholars and historians who had testified before the House 
Subcommittee on the Constitution on November 9, 1998. Fourteen of the nineteen indicated 
that they thought censure was constitutional. 
88 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
89 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
90 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
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In addition, the House and the Senate each have passed resolutions con-
demning or criticizing the misconduct of presidents and other high-ranking 
officials. Indeed, on at least two occasions, the House has memorialized its 
disapproval of presidential misconduct. The subjects of the latter resolutions 
were President Polk and President Buchanan.91 Moreover, though the 
House had decided not to impeach President Tyler for his exuberant exer-
cises of his veto authority, the House did adopt a House Committee report 
that was highly critical of President Tyler's exercise of his veto authority.92 In 
addition, the Senate censured President Andrew Jackson for firing his Treas-
ury Secretary for refusing to implement Jackson's instructions to withdraw 
national bank funds and to deposit them in state banks.93 Such resolutions 
provide historical precedents for the House and the Senate to do something 
similar with respect to President Clinton (or any other official). For that mat-
ter, the thousands of resolutions that the House and the Senate each have 
passed over the years expressing their opinions on a \vide variety of public 
matters constitute other relevant precedents supporting the House's or the 
Senate's passage of a resolution expressing its condemnation or disapproval 
of a President's conduct. (Indeed, the House also has passed at least three 
resolutions expressing its disapproval of conduct by high-ranking executive 
officials other than the President, while the Senate also has passed two such 
resolutions in the nineteenth century.)94 
F. The Judgment of History 
Yet another significant pattern in impeachment proceedings is that as 
they unfold, members of Congress increasingly feel the pressure to find some 
nonpartisan basis for their decisions that will withstand the test of time. This 
pressure comes from the increasing awareness that the legitimacy of senators' 
decisionmaking will depend on not just the public's acceptance of its actions 
but also the judgment of history. In The Federalist No. 65, Alexander Hamil-
ton warned that linpeachments often would begin in a partisan atmosphere.9s 
Consequently, Hamilton counseled, the further along an impeachment pro-
ceeded, the more that members of Congress needed to find a nonpartisan 
basis on which to resolve the proceedings. The historical record is replete 
\vith senators who in the midst or near the end of impeachment trials ex-
pressed the awareness that their final decision to achieve legitimacy needed 
to withstand the test of time. As Senator William Fessenden commented 
near the end of President Andrew Johnson's trial, the burden was then on the 
Senate, given the partisan origins of the proceedings, to reach a judgment 
about which '~all right-thinking men would agree."96 This comment is consis-
91 See CoNG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1848) (resolution describing the Mexican-
American War as "a war unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the 
United States"); JoHN MAsKELL, CENSURE OF THE PRESIDENT BY THE CoNGRESS 5 {Cong. Res. 
Serv. No. 98-843A, Dec. 8, 1998). 
92 See HousE JoURNAL, 27th Cong., 2d Sess., 1343-52 (1842). 
93 See SENATE JoURNAL, 23rd Cong., 1st Sess., 197 {1834). 
94 See MAsKELL, supra note 91, at 4-8. 
95 See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 57. 
96 THE TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE 
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tent not only with many of the Ratifiers' expectations about impeachment 
but also with most subsequent scholars' and senators' perceptions of the very 
high threshold that an impeachment decision must satisfy in order to with-
stand the test of time. 
IV. Conclusion 
My sense of the history of the federal impeachment process, as reflected 
in the debates in the constitutional and state ratifying conventions and Con-
gress's subsequent exercises of its impeachment authority, is that "other high 
Crimes or Misdemeanors" are technical terms of art that refer to so-called 
political crimes. Political crimes are abuses of power or the kinds of miscon-
duct that can be committed only by some public officials by virtue of the 
public offices or special trust that they hold. These political crimes are not 
necessarily indictable offenses. Nor do all indictable offenses constitute polit-
ical crimes. 
Whether or not some misconduct by a public official is a political crime 
or rises to the level of an impeachable offense turns on a number of different 
factors. These factors are apparent from studying the constitutional and state 
ratifying convention debates as well as Congress's impeachment decisions 
and practices. These factors include, but are not limited to, the seriousness of 
the misconduct, its timing, the link between the misconduct and the official's 
official responsibilities or special trust held by virtue of the positions held by 
the official, alternative means of redress, and the degree of injury caused to 
the Republic by the misconduct in question. 
Studying Congress's impeachment decisions also reveals some notewor-
thy patterns. Most, if not all, impeachments made by the House and convic-
tions made by the Senate have followed or approximated the paradigm of an 
impeachable offense-the abuse of official power or privilege. In doing so, 
congressional practices have been quite consistent with the Framers' and Ra-
tifiers' statements and scholarly commentary recognizing impeachment as a 
unique component of the constitutional scheme of checks and balances. The 
Constitution embodies the judgments that the judiciary and the President (as 
a symbol of the executive branch) each need to be independent (to some 
meaningful degree) and possess the vitality and stature necessary to allow the 
judiciary and the President to act as checks on the national legislature. In 
other words, congressional practices reflect the judgment that the Constitu-
tion envisions that impeachment should not be used to punish or to retaliate 
against impeachable officials, such as the President and federal judges, be-
cause of their opinions, policy differences, or innocent errors of judgment. 
Nor should impeachment be used for largely partisan purposes; hence, some 
senators refused to convict Associate Justice Samuel Chase or President An-
drew Johnson for fear that if either were removed, future presidents or 
judges from the senators' party likely would be punished in the impeachment 
process just by virtue of their party affiliation. Rather, impeachment gener-
ally should be deployed against impeachable officials for having engaged in 
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FOR 
HIGH CRIMES AND MisDEMEANORS 30 (1868) (opinion of Sen. William P. Fessenden). 
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some misconduct that has caused serious injury to the Republic or to the 
constitutional system. 
The one, or at most two, impeachments that arguably do not fit neatly 
into the paradigm, those of Harry Claiborne and Walter Nixon, might be 
explained in two ways. They could be explained on the grounds that integrity 
is the single most important asset that a federal judge needs to do his job and 
that a demonstrated lack of integrity thoroughly robs a judge of the moral 
authority to continue to function and disables him completely from continu-
ing to perform his constitutional function. Alternatively, the impeachment 
and removal of Walter Nixon, and particularly the impeachment and removal 
of Harry Claiborne, could be explained as signaling the existence of a second 
category of offenses consisting of the kinds of misconduct that are so outra-
geous and so incompatible with the status or duties of the officials who have 
committed them that Congress has no choice but to impeach and remove 
those officials. 
Of course, another important lesson of impeachment history is that it is 
left to the discretion of the members of Congress to determine whether a 
particular impeachable official's misconduct fits within the paradigmatic case 
for impeachment and removal or the exception of outrageousness. In exer-
cising their discretion, members of Congress must confront unique and signif-
icant issues and the necessity to rise above partisan politics to make 
principled constitutional judgments that will withstand the test of time or face 
the possibility of short-term political fall-out or the condemnation of history 
for their failure to do so. · 
